In this paper, we consider an exchange economyà la Shitovitz (1973) , with atoms and an atomless set. We associate with it a strategic market game of the kind first proposed by Lloyd S. Shapley, known as the Shapley window model. We analyze the relationship between the set of the Cournot-Nash allocations of the strategic market game and the Walras allocations of the exchange economy with which it is associated. We show, with an example, that even when atoms are countably infinite, any Cournot-Nash allocation of the game is not a Walras allocation of the underlying exchange economy. Accordingly, in the original spirit of Cournot (1838), we partially replicate the mixed exchange economy by increasing the number of atoms, without affecting the atomless part, and ensuring that the measure space of agents remains finite. Our main theorem shows that any sequence of CournotNash allocations of the strategic market games associated with the partial replications of the exchange economy has a limit point for each trader and that the assignment determined by these limit points is a Walrasian allocation of the original economy.
Introduction
A large literature has been developed in the past decades, aiming at extending to a general equilibrium framework the classical Cournot's theory of oligopoly (see Cournot (1838) ), where oligopolistic agents that interact noncooperatively among themselves face a sector of consumers taking prices as given. Most of the contributions on this issue belongs to two main lines of research: the Cournot-Walras equilibrium approach, initiated by Gabszewicz and Vial (1972) , and the strategic market game approach, initiated by Shapley and Shubik (1977) .
In their 1972's paper, Gabszewicz and Vial transposed to a general equilibrium setting Cournot's original idea of an asymmetric economy with production, in which firms with oligopolistic power that interact strategically on quantities face a sector of consumers behavingà la Walras. Nevertheless, in the same paper, they pointed out two major difficulties inherent in the standard Cournotian approach with strategic firms: first, profit maximization may not be a rational objective for firms that have influence on prices; second, the equilibrium is not independent from the rule chosen to normalize prices. These difficulties have been overcome within the Cournot-Walras approach by moving to the analysis of pure exchange economies (see Codognato and Gabszewicz (1993) , d'Aspremont, Dos Santos Ferreira, and Gérard-Varet (1997), Gabszewicz and Michel (1997) , Shitovitz (1997) , among others). However, this latter class of models do not avoid a well-known problem inherent in the Cournot-Walras approach: there, an equilibrium may not exist, even in mixed strategies, since the Walras price correspondence may fail to admit a continuous selection (see Dierker and Grodal (1986) ). A further fundamental problem common to the whole Cournot-Walras approach is that it leaves unexplained why some agents behave strategically while other agents behave competitively.
A different approach has been developed (still in pure exchange), that uses strategic market gamesà la Shapley and Shubik with the aim at providing a formal explanation of perfectly and imperfectly competitive behavior. A fundamental contribution in this line is the paper of Okuno, Postlewaite and Roberts (1980) . In particular, since the work of these authors, results in this direction have been obtained by incorporating within the framework of strategic market games a mixed measure space of tradersà la Shitovitz (1973) , composed by large traders, represented as atoms, and small traders, represented by an atomless part. In this setting, while all agents have a priori the same strategic position, some of them turn out to have influence on prices and some other turn out to be Walrasian, depending on their characteristics and their weight in the economy. Then, the asymmetric structure typical of the Cournotian theory is endogenously generated.
Busetto, Codognato, and Ghosal (2011) obtained a generalization of Okuno et al.'s work by using a mixed version of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium model first proposed by Lloyd S. Shapley, and known as the Shapley window model (this model was analyzed, in the case of finite economies, by Sahi and Yao (1989) ). Busetto et al. (2011) provided an endogenous explanation of oligopolistic and competitive behavior. Moreover, working within this strategic market game framework permitted them to show the existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies, and then to overcome the non-continuity problem which characterizes the Cournot-Walras approach.
This paper studies the link between Cournot and Walras equilibrium, with the aim of providing a noncooperative foundation to the theory of perfect competition. A mixed exchange economyà la Shitovitz is associated with the same strategic market gameà la Shapley proposed by Busetto et al. (2011) . Within this framework, the relationship between the set of the Cournot-Nash allocations of the strategic market game and the Walras allocations of the underlying exchange economy is examined. We show, with an example, that even when the set of atoms is countably infinite, there is the robust possibility that no Cournot-Nash allocation of the strategic market game is a Walras allocation of the underlying exchange economy, because some atoms remain non-negligible in size. This non equivalence result then motivates us to analyze the asymptotic relationship between appropriately defined sequences of Cournot-Nash allocations of the strategic market game and the Walras allocations of the exchange economy. We do this by introducing a concept of replication which we callà la Cournot, since it extends to a general equilibrium context the original Cournotian idea of replication: that is, we partially replicate the economy by increasing only the number of atoms, this way making them asymptotically negligible, without affecting the atomless part. At the same time, the mechanism of replication of atoms is constructed in such a way that the measure space of traders remains finite. If this requirement was not satisfied, the general equilibrium model of oligopoly studied in the paper would not be well-defined. Our main theorem establishes that any sequence of Cournot-Nash allocations of the strategic market games associated with the partial replications of the exchange economy has a limit point for each trader and that the assignment determined by these limit points is a Walrasian allocation of the original economy.
To prove the limit theorem, we use analytical tools introduced by Sahi and Yao (1989) to show their convergence result for finite economies, and by Codognato and Ghosal (2000) to show their equivalence theoremà la Aumann (1964) . However, we have to tackle new technical issues due to the fact that the space of traders has a mixed nature. To this end, we exploit some tools previously applied to the Shapley window model for mixed economies by Busetto et al. (2011) . In particular, in order to determine the limit points of the sequences of Cournot-Nash allocations, we use a version of the Fatou's lemma in several dimensions proved by Artstein (1979) . Moreover, a key point in our paper is that since the Walrasian price taking behavior of small traders is not assumed a priori, as in the Cournot-Walras equilibrium models, but endogenously generated, we do not need to impose any continuity assumption on the selections from the Walras price correspondence.
The general equilibrium approach adopted here distinguishes our limit result from the well-known results, obtained within the Cournotian tradition in partial equilibrium, establishing that the Cournot equilibrium approaches the competitive equilibrium as the number of oligopolists goes to infinity (see Frank (1965) , Ruffin (1971) , Novshek (1980) , among others).
Our limit result is also different from existing results in the strategic market game literature: within their Shapley window model for finite economies, Sahi and Yao (1989) showed the convergence of sequences of Cournot-Nash allocations to a Walras allocation by using a replication conceptà la Edgeworth, in which all types of agents are replicated (on this kind of replication see Debreu and Scarf (1963) ).
Other limit results were obtained within the line opened by Gabszewicz and Vial: see Roberts (1980) , Mas-Colell (1983) , and Novshek and Sonnenschein ((1983) , (1987)), among others. Also these results are obtained by using replication concepts in which all types of agents are replicated. Moreover, as stressed by Mas-Colell (1982) (see, in particular, pp. 203-204)), they depend in an essential way on the assumption that there exists a continuous selection from the Walras price correspondence.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we build the mathematical model. In Section 3, we introduce the notion of a δ-positive CournotNash equilibrium used in the construction of the limit theorem, and we state a theorem on its existence (the proof is in the Appendix). In Section 4, we provide the example on the non-equivalence between the sets of Cournot-Nash and Walras allocations when the atoms are countably infinite. In Section 5, we introduce the replicationà la Cournot. In Section 6, we state the existence of a δ-positive atom-type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium (the proof is in the Appendix). In Section 7, we state and prove the limit theorem.
The mathematical model
We consider a pure exchange economy, E, with large traders, represented as atoms, and small traders, represented by an atomless part. The space of traders is denoted by the measure space (T, T , µ), where T is the set of traders, T is the σ-algebra of all µ-measurable subsets of T , and µ is a real valued, non-negative, countably additive measure defined on T . We assume that (T, T , µ) is finite, i.e., µ(T ) < ∞. This implies that the measure space (T, T , µ) contains at most countably many atoms. Let T 1 denote the set of atoms and T 0 = T \ T 1 the atomless part of T . A null set of traders is a set of measure 0. Null sets of traders are systematically ignored throughout the paper. Thus, a statement asserted for "each" trader in a certain set is to be understood to hold for all such traders except possibly for a null set of traders. The word "integrable" is to be understood in the sense of Lebesgue.
In the exchange economy, there are l different commodities. A commodity bundle is a point in R l
+ . An assignment (of commodity bundles to traders) is an integrable function x:
There is a fixed initial assignment w, satisfying the following assumption.
Assumption 1. w(t) > 0, for each t ∈ T .
An allocation is an assignment x for which
The preferences of each trader t ∈ T are described by a utility function u t : R l + → R, satisfying the following assumptions. Assumption 2. u t : R l + → R is continuous, strongly monotone, and quasiconcave, for each t ∈ T .
Let B denote the Borel σ-algebra of R l + . Moreover, let T ⊗ B denote the σ-algebra generated by all the sets E × F such that E ∈ T and F ∈ B.
We also need the following assumption (see Sahi and Yao (1989) ).
Assumption 4. There are at least two traders in
A price vector is a nonnull vector p ∈ R l + . A Walras equilibrium of E is a pair (p * , x * ), consisting of a price vector p * and an allocation x * , such that, for each t ∈ T , u t (x * (t)) ≥ u t (y), for all y ∈ {x ∈ R l + : p * x = p * w(t)}. A Walras allocation of E is an allocation x * for which there exists a price vector p * such that the pair (p * , x * ) is a Walras equilibrium of E.
We define now the strategic market game, Γ, associated with E.
. . , l, represents the amount of commodity i that trader t offers in exchange for commodity j. Moreover, we denote, with some abuse of notation, by b(t) ∈ B(t) a strategy of trader t. A strategy selection is an integrable function b : T → R l 2 + , such that, for each t ∈ T , b(t) ∈ B(t). Given a strategy selection b, we call aggregate matrix the matrixB such thatb ij = (
Moreover, we denote by b \ b(t) the strategy selection obtained from b by replacing b(t) with b(t) ∈ B(t) and byB \ b(t) the corresponding aggregate matrix.
Then, we introduce two further definitions (see Sahi and Yao (1989) ).
Definition 1. A nonnegative square matrix A is said to be irreducible if, for every pair
ij denotes the ij-th entry of the k-th power A k of A.
Definition 2. Given a strategy selection b, a price vector p is said to be market clearing if
By Lemma 1 in Sahi and Yao (1989) , there is a unique, up to a scalar multiple, price vector p satisfying (1) if and only ifB is irreducible. Then, we denote by p(b) a function which associates with each strategy selection b the unique, up to a scalar multiple, price vector p satisfying (1), ifB is irreducible, and is equal to 0, otherwise.
Given a strategy selection b and a price vector p, consider the assignment determined as follows:
Given a strategy selection b and the function p(b), the traders' final holdings are determined according to this rule and consequently expressed by the assignment
We are now able to define a Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γ (see Codognato and Ghosal (2000) and Busetto et al. (2011) ).
Definition 3. A strategy selectionb such thatB is irreducible is a CournotNash equilibrium of Γ if
u t (x(t,b(t), p(b))) ≥ u t (x(t, b(t), p(b \ b(t)))),
for each b(t) ∈ B(t) and for each t ∈ T . 2
A Cournot-Nash allocation of Γ is an allocationx such thatx(t) = x(t,b(t), p(b)), for each t ∈ T , whereb is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γ. 
. . , l}}, for each t ∈T 1 and if B δ (t) = B(t), for the remaining traders t ∈ T . Moreover, we say that a strategy selection b is δ-positive if b(t) ∈ B δ (t), for each t ∈ T . Finally, we say that a Cournot-Nash equilibriumb of Γ is δ-positive ifb is a δ-positive strategy selection.
The following theorem shows the existence of a δ-positive Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γ. It is a straightforward consequence of the existence theorem in Busetto et al. (2011) .
Theorem 1. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4, there exists a δ-positive
Cournot-Nash equilibriumb of Γ.
Proof. See the Appendix. Sahi and Yao (1989) formalized the Shapley window model in the context of an exchange economy with a finite set of traders. Codognato and Ghosal (2000) reconsidered the Sahi and Yao's model within an exchange economy with an atomless continuum of traders. In this framework, they showed an equivalence resultà la Aumann (1964) between the set of the Cournot-Nash allocations of the window model and the set of the Walras allocations of the underlying exchange economy. The mixed measure space we are considering here may contain countably infinite atoms. This raises the question whether an equivalence result can be obtained also in this case. The following example provides a negative answer to this question.
An example
Consider an exchange economy E where l = 2, which satisfies Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4. Moreover, assume that T 1 contains countably infinite atoms and that there is an atom τ ∈ T 1 such that w 1 (τ ) = 0,
) is differentiable, and
Suppose thatb is a Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γ and that the allocationx(t) = x(t,b(t), p(b)), for each t ∈ T , is a Walras allocation of E. Then, there is a price vectorp such that the pair (p,x) is a Walras equilibrium of E. We have thatp ≫ 0 as u t (·) is strongly monotone, for each t ∈ T , andx(τ ) ≫ 0 as
aspx(τ ) =pw(τ ) and p(b)x(τ ) = p(b)w(τ ). Moreover, we have that 0 <b 21 (τ ) < w 2 (τ ) asx(τ ) ≫ 0, andb 12 (τ ) = 0 as w 1 (τ ) = 0. Since
and
with α > 0, by (1) and Lemma 2 in Sahi and Yao (1989), trader τ 's final holding, given the Cournot-Nash equilibrium strategies of the other traders, is
Then, trader τ 's payoff as a function of his own strategy, given the CournotNash equilibrium strategies of the other traders, is
The derivative of this function with respect to trader τ 's strategy is
Computing this derivative at b(τ ) =b(τ ), we obtain
. Consequently, we have
by (2) and the pair (p,x) is a Walras equilibrium of E. But then, we must have thatb 21 (τ ) = 0, a contradiction. Hence,x is not a Walras allocation of E. This shows that the condition that E contains a countably infinite number of atoms is not sufficient to guarantee that any Cournot-Nash allocation of Γ is a Walras allocation of E.
The replicationà la Cournot of E
The negative result obtained in the previous section leads us to deal with the question whether a limit result can be instead obtained by replicating the exchange economy E.
We address this question by introducing a concept of replication in the original spirit of Cournot (1838). By analogy with the replication proposed by Cournot in a partial equilibrium framework, the concept we propose is obtained in fact by replicating only the atoms of E, while making them asymptotically negligible, and without affecting the atomless part.
This partial replicationà la Cournot of E can be formalized as follows. Let E n be an exchange economy characterized as in Section 2, where each atom is replicated n times. For each t ∈ T 1 , let tr denote the r-th element of the n-fold replication of t. We assume that, for each t ∈ T 1 , w(tr) = w(ts) = w(t), u tr (·) = u ts (·) = u t (·), r, s = 1, . . . , n, and µ(tr) = µ(t) n , r = 1, . . . , n. Clearly, E 1 coincides with E.
Then, the strategic market game Γ n associated with E n can be characterized, mutatis mutandis, as in Section 2. Clearly, Γ 1 coincides with Γ. A strategy selection b of Γ n is said to be atom-type-symmetric if b n (tr) = b n (ts), r, s = 1, . . . , n, for each t ∈ T 1 .
We provide now the definition of an atom-type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γ n . tr, b(tr), p(b \ b(tr))) ), for each b(tr) ∈ B(tr), r = 1, . . . , n, and for each t ∈ T 1 ;
Definition 4. A strategy selectionb such thatB is irreducible is an atomtype-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γ n ifb is atom-type-symmetric and if
for each b(t) ∈ B(t) and for each t ∈ T 0 .
6 The existence of a δ-positive atom-type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γ n In this section, we introduce the notion of a δ-positive atom-type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γ n . Moreover, we state and prove that an equilibrium of this kind exists under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4. This result is needed to show our limit theorem by using the replicationà la Cournot introduced in Section 5. Let δ be determined as in Section 3. Also a δ-positive strategy correspondence, B δ , is defined, mutatis mutandis, as in Section 3. Notice that B δ (tr) = B δ (ts), r, s = 1, . . . , n, for each t ∈ T 1 . We say that a strategy selection b is δ-positive if b(tr) ∈ B δ (tr), r = 1, . . . , n, for each t ∈ T 1 , and b(t) ∈ B δ (t), for each t ∈ T 0 . Then, we say that an atom-type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibriumb of Γ n is δ-positive ifb is a δ-positive strategy selection.
The following theorem establishes the existence of a δ-positive atomtype-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γ n . The proof of the theorem adapts to our context tools and arguments developed by Sahi and Yao (1989) and Busetto et al. (2011) to show the existence of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the Shapley window model, respectively in the case of a finite set of traders and in the case of a mixed measure space of tradersà la Shitovitz.
Theorem 2. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4, there exists a δ-positive atom-type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibriumb of Γ n .
Proof. See the Appendix.
The limit theorem
In this section, we state and prove the limit theorem. It establishes that, given a sequence of atom-type-symmetric Cournot-Nash allocations of Γ n , for n = 1, 2, . . ., there exists a Walras allocation of E with this property: for each trader t ∈ T , the value of this Walras allocation at t is a limit point of the sequence of final holdings of t associated with the sequence of atom-type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibria of Γ n , for n = 1, 2, . . .. Under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4 , let {b n } be a sequence of strategy selections of Γ and let {p n } be a sequence of prices such that 
Theorem 3.
b n (t) =b Γ n (tr), r = 1, . . . , n, for each t ∈ T 1 ,b n (t) =b Γ n (t), for each t ∈ T 0 , andp n = p(b Γ n ),
ii)x(t) is the limit of the sequence {x kn (t)}, for each t ∈ T 1 , andx(t) is a limit point of the sequence {x kn (t)}, for each t ∈ T 0 , wherex(t) = x(t,b(t),p) for each t ∈ T ,x kn (t) = x(t,b kn (t),p kn ), for each t ∈ T , and for n = 1, 2, . . .; (iii) the pair (p,x) is a Walras equilibrium of E.
Proof. (i) Let {b n } be a sequence of strategy selections of Γ and let {p n } be a sequence of prices such thatb n (t) =b Γ n (tr), r = 1, . . . , n, for each t ∈ T 1 ,b n (t) =b Γ n (t), for each t ∈ T 0 , andp n = p(b Γ n ), whereb Γ n is a δ-positive atom-type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γ n , for n = 1, 2, . . .. The facts that the sequence {B n } belongs to the compact set
. . , l}}, the sequence {b n (t)} belongs to the compact set B δ (t), for each t ∈ T 1 , and the sequence {p n }, belongs, by Lemma 9 in Sahi and Yao, to a compact set P , imply that there is a subsequence {B kn } of the sequence {B n } which converges to an element of the set
. . , l}}, a subsequence {b kn (t)} of the sequence {b n (t)} which converges to an element of the set B δ (t), for each t ∈ T 1 , and a subsequence {p kn } of the sequence {p n } which converges to an elementp of the set P . Moreover, by Lemma 9 in Sahi and Yao,p ≫ 0. Since the sequence {b kn } satisfies the assumptions of Theorem A in Artstein (1979) , there is a functionb such thatb(t) is the limit of the sequence {b kn (t)}, for each t ∈ T 1 ,b(t) is a limit point of the sequence {b kn (t)}, for each t ∈ T 0 , and such that the sequence {B kn } converges toB.
(ii) Letx(t) = x(t,b(t),p) for each t ∈ T ,x kn (t) = x(t,b kn (t),p kn ), for each t ∈ T , and for n = 1, 2, . . .. Then,x(t) is the limit of the sequence {x kn (t)}, for each t ∈ T 1 , asb(t) is the limit of the sequence {b kn (t)}, for each t ∈ T 1 , and the sequence {p kn } converges top,x(t) is a limit point of the sequence {x kn (t)}, for each t ∈ T 0 , asb(t) is a limit point of the sequence {b kn (t)}, for each t ∈ T 0 , and the sequence {p kn } converges top. (1), for n = 1, 2, . . .. But then, by continuity,p andb must satisfy (1). Therefore, Lemma 1 in Sahi and Yao implies thatB is completely reducible. Moreover,b(t) ∈ B δ (t) sinceb(t) is a limit point of the sequence {b kn (t)}, for all t ∈ T . Then,b is δ-positive. But then, by Remark 3 in Sahi and Yao, B must be irreducible. Consider the pair (p,x). It is straightforward to show that the assignmentx is an allocation asp andb satisfy (1) and that x(t) ∈ {x ∈ R l + :px =pw(t)}, for all t ∈ T . Suppose that (p,x) is not a Walras equilibrium of E. Then, there exists a trader τ ∈ T and a commodity bundlex ∈ {x ∈ R l + :px =pw(τ )} such that u τ (x) > u τ (x(τ )). By Lemma 5 in Codognato and Ghosal (2000) , there existλ j ≥ 0,
Then, it is straightforward to verify that
for each j = 1, . . . , l. Consider the following cases. = max{w 1 (τ ), . . . , w l (τ )}. Consider the matrixB
\b(τ ρ)} converges toB as, by the triangle inequality, ∥B 
is a δ-positive atom-type-symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γ hn , for n = 1, 2, . . .. Letb hn \b(τ ) be a strategy selection obtained by replacingb hn (τ ) inb hn withb, for n = 1, 2, . . 
, by Assumption 2, as the sequence {b hn (τ )} converges tob(τ ), the sequence {q Γ hn } converges to q, the sequence {q Γ hn τ ρ } converges to q, andp = θq, with θ > 0, by Lemma 2 in Sahi and Yao, a contradiction. Case 2. τ ∈ T 0 . Let {b h kn (τ )} be a subsequence of the sequence {b kn (τ )} which converges tob(τ ). Moreover, letb Γ h kn \b(τ ) be a strategy se- 
, by Assumption 2, as the sequence {b h kn (τ )} converges tob(τ ) and the sequence {p h kn } converges top, a contradiction. Hence, the pair (p,x) is a Walras equilibrium of E.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. Busetto et al. (2011) showed that, under Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4, there exists a Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γ,b, such that, for each t ∈ T ,b(t) ∈ B δ (t). This implies thatb is a δ-positive Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γ.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let us introduce a slightly perturbed version of the game Γ n , denoted by Γ n (ϵ). Given ϵ > 0 and a strategy selection b, we define the aggregate matrixB ϵ to be the matrix such thatb ϵij = (b ij + ϵ), i, j = 1, . . . , l. Clearly, the matrixB ϵ is irreducible. The interpretation is that an outside agency places fixed bids of ϵ for each pair of commodities (i, j). Given ϵ > 0, we denote by p ϵ (b) the function which associates, with each strategy selection b, the unique, up to a scalar multiple, price vector which satisfies
Then, let us introduce the following notion of equilibrium for Γ n (ϵ).
Definition 5.
Given ϵ > 0, a strategy selectionb ϵ is an atom-type-symmetric ϵ-Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γ n (ϵ) ifb ϵ is atom-type-symmetric and
for each b(tr) ∈ B(tr), r = 1, . . . , n, and for each t ∈ T 1 ;
Moreover, we say that an atom-type-symmetric ϵ-Cournot-Nash equilibriumb ϵ of Γ n (ϵ) is δ-positive ifb ϵ is a δ-positive strategy selection.
To show Theorem 2, we first need to prove the existence of a δ-positive atom-type-symmetric ϵ-Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γ n (ϵ). To do so, we apply, as in Busetto et al. (2011) , the Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg Theorem (see Theorem 17.55 in Aliprantis and Border (2006) , p. 583).
We neglect, as usual, the distinction between integrable functions and equivalence classes of such functions and denote by L 1 (µ, R l 2 ) the set of integrable functions taking values in R l 2 , by L 1 (µ, B(·) ) the set of strategy selections, and by L 1 (µ, B * (·)) the set of atom-type-symmetric strategy selections. Note that the locally convex Hausdorff space we shall be working in is L 1 (µ, R l 2 ), endowed with its weak topology.
The proof of existence of a δ-positive atom-type-symmetric ϵ-CournotNash equilibrium of Γ n (ϵ) is articulated in three lemmas.
The first lemma establishes the properties of L 1 (µ, B * (·)) required to apply the Kakutani-Fan-Glicksberg Theorem. To complete the proof of Theorem 2, we have to show that there exists the limit of a sequence of δ-positive atom-type-symmetric ϵ-Cournot-Nash equilibria and that this limit is a δ-positive atom-type-symmetric ϵ-CournotNash equilibrium of Γ n . Following Busetto et al. (2011) , in this part of the proof we essentially refer to Lemma 9 in Sahi and Yao (1989) and a generalization of the Fatou's lemma in several dimensions provided by Artstein (1979) .
Then, let ϵ m = sequence {b ϵm (tr)} which converges to an element of the set B δ (tr), r = 1, . . . , n, for each t ∈ T 1 , and a subsequence {p ϵ km } of the sequence {p ϵm } which converges to an element of the set P . Since the sequence {b ϵ km } satisfies the assumptions of Theorem A in Artstein (1979) , there is a function b such thatb(tr) is the limit of the sequence {b ϵ km (tr)}, r = 1, . . . , n, for each t ∈ T 1 ,b(t) is a limit point of the sequence {b ϵ km (t)}, for each t ∈ T 0 , and such that the sequence {B ϵ km } converges toB. Then,b(tr) =b(ts)
as {b ϵ km (tr)} = {b ϵ km (ts)}, r, s = 1, . . . , n, for each t ∈ T 1 , andb(tr) is the limit of the sequence {b ϵ km (tr)}, r = 1, . . . , n, for each t ∈ T 1 . Hence, it can be proved, by the same argument used by Busetto et al. (2011) to show their existence theorem, thatb is an atom-type-symmetric δ-positive Cournot-Nash equilibrium of Γ n (ϵ).
